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CASE COMMENTS
Trial-Argument of Council-Use of Formula Not
Based on Evidence
In an action to recover damages for injuries resulting from
a vehicle collision, P's counsel in his argument to the jury suggested
a money value for pain and suffering based on a mathematical
formula or fixed-time basis. D appealed, claiming error. Held,
an argument based on a mathematical formula or fixed-time basis,
suggesting a monetary value for pain and suffering, is not based
on facts or reasonable inferences drawn from facts before the jury
and constitutes reversible error. Crum v. Ward, 122 S.E.2d 18 (W.
Va. 1961).
It is generally recognized that pain and suffering cannot be
measured in terms of dollars and cents and that the only standard
is such an amount as a reasonable person would estimate as fair
compensation. Roedder v. Rowley, 28 Cal. App. 2d 820, 172 P.2d
353 (1946). The determination of such compensation is left to
the sound discretion of the jury. Yuncke v. Welker, 128 W. Va.
299, 36 S.E.2d 410 (1945); Landau v. Farr, 104 W. Va. 445, 140
S.E. 141 (1927).
The problem arises when counsel for the plaintiff suggests to
the jury a method of determining compensation for pain and suffer-
ing founded on a mathematical formula or fixed-time basis. The
authorities are quite divided on this question.
In the principal case the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, in a three to two decision, has relegated the use of math-
ematical formula not founded on evidence to determine the award
of damages for pain and suffering to that of mere speculation by
counsel. In so holding, the West Virginia court is adhering to the
strict rule laid down in New Jersey in Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J.
82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958). There the court held that counsel's
suggestion to the jury by mathematical formula of an amount it
should award per minute, hour or day for pain and suffering was
improper as it constituted "an unwarranted intrusion into the domain
of the jury." The court said that the assessment of damages for
personal injury could not be gauged by any graduated scale.
In adopting the rule of Botta v. Brunner, the West Virginia
court is assuming a position that has been severely criticized in
many areas. The criticism centers mainly around the feeling that
it is necessary for the jury to be guided by some reasonable and
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practical considerations in awarding damages and that refusal to
allow plaintiff's counsel to suggest a means of arriving at such
compensation encourages the triers of the facts to make a blind
guess. The contention is urged that, with proper admonition by
the court that the use of mathematical formula is not evidence,
such argument can provide the jury with an estimate of damages
appropriately tailored to the evidence of the particular case. Ratner
v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). Through-
out the cases holding contrary to the Botta rule, there is prevalent
one central theme-counsel for plaintiff should be allowed to state
to the jury what he thinks should be proper damages for pain and
suffering. Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 109 N.W.2d 828 (1961).
The absence of a standard for determining the monetary value
of pain and suffering is pointed out as making rather questionable
the contention that counsel's suggestions of amounts to be awarded
on a per diem basis are misleading to a jury. While speculation
by counsel is not permissible, a legitimate area of persuasion in
any action is to employ inferences and conclusions based upon the
evidence of the case. A serious objection to the rule of Botta v.
Brunner, supra, is that counsel for plaintiff is somewhat hampered
in imploring the jury to return a verdict in the amount desired.
The question is raised: Is an attorney's attempt to evaluate pain
on a daily basis any more speculative than his attempt to place a
monetary value on total pain and suffering?
In New Jersey the rule is that neither the court nor counsel
is allowed to make reference to the ad damnum clause of the com-
plaint. There, perhaps, some justification exists for the disallowance
of mathematical formula. But the application of this rule in West
Virginia, a jurisdiction which allows free reference to the ad dam-
num clause, presents legitimate grounds for question. Johnson v.
Brown, 75 Nev. 437, 345 P.2d 754 (1959).
Judge Haymond of the West Virginia court, in a dissent in
the principal case, compares such a practice with requiring the find-
ing of a sum "without adding together its separate parts."
A number of jurisdictions permit the use of mathematical
formula arguments where cautionary safeguards, such as strong ad-
monitions to the jury that counsel's statements are not evidence, are
applied. Whether, under the circumstances of the particular case,
counsel's arguments suggesting a mathematical basis for determining
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such damages is an improper invasion of the rights of the jury is,
according to this view, to be determined by the trial judge in the
exercise of judicial discretion. lohnson v. Brown, supra; Olsen v.
Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 23, 354 P.2d 575
(1960).
But the rule in West Virginia now appears to be that, even
with admonitions by the court that mathematical formula suggestions
are not evidence, the use in argument of such formula to determine
the award of damages for pain and suffering constitutes grounds
for reversible error. The West Virginia court justifies the adoption
of this rule as a means of avoiding excessive verdicts engendered
by prejudice, compassion and sympathy. This same justification is
evident in Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. 1959), wherein
the court held that the use in argument of a mathematical formula
to determine damages was calculated and designed to implant in
the jurors' minds figures and amounts not in the record and to in-
fluence jurors to adopt those figures and amounts as a method of
arriving at an award for pain and suffering.
The use of mathematical formulae, in the opinion of the ma-
jority of the West Virginia court, amounts to counsers giving testi-
mony and expressing opinions and conclusions on matters not dis-
closed by evidence. This, it might be noted, is the prevalent opinion
among the adherents to the Botta rule. Certified T. V. & Appliance
Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 126 (1959); Affett v.
Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W.2d
274 (1960). The admonition of the court that the jury should
not consider such suggestions as evidence is considered as failing
to erase the prejudicial effect of their use.
The adoption of the Botta rule by the West Virginia court is
not without merit. Accepting the premise, as do the adherents to
the Botta rule, that the use of mathematical formula arguments
constitutes mere speculation not based on evidence, the conclusion
seems inescapable that the defendant is faced with the dilemma of
either rebutting an argument not based on evidence, or ignoring
the argument and risking the consequences. In addition, there is
some basis for the argument that uncertainty as to the worth of pain
and suffering does not change the problem from one of judgment
to one of calculation. Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 80
So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1955).
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It is to be noted that the principal case does not prevent the
use of a blackboard or similar method in argument to the jury if
based on evidence. The use of the blackboard is limited only in so
far as it relates to the use of mathematical formula not based on
evidence.
The weight of authority appears to be in opposition to the
rule of Botta v. Brunner, supra, but the ultimate course of judicial
opinion on this question is by no means settled. The problem is a
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